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Abstract
This work proves an improved lower bound for the quantum query complexity of
collision-finding in hash functions whose images are distributed according to a non-
uniform distribution. Recent work by [TTU16] applied the leftover hash lemma to show
that at least ⌦(2k/9) quantum queries are necessary to find a collision when the image
distribution has min-entropy k. In comparison, a result by [Zha15] implies that ⌦(2k/3)
quantum queries are necessary if the distribution is uniform. In this paper the lower
bound complexity of [Zha15] is extended directly to the non-uniform case using a chain
of reductions which convert collisions in min-entropy k distributions into collisions in
the uniform distribution with constant probability. This result shows a minimum secu-
rity guarantee for hash functions under more general assumptions in which the image
distribution may not be uniform.
1 Introduction
A hash function is a cryptographic primitive which exploits a property called collision resis-
tance for various purposes [KL15]. Collision resistance refers to the difficulty of locating a
collision in the hash function, that is, finding two distinct inputs which the function maps
to the same output. This property is particularly non-trivial because the domain of a hash
function is usually binary strings of arbitrary length, while the co-domain is a binary string
of a fixed length. It follows that a large number of collisions must exist, and the hash function
must be designed so that these collisions are difficult to locate in the domain. The collision
resistance property is what makes hash functions useful in cryptographic applications like
message authentication [BCK96] and password hashing [Kal00].
For the analysis of hash function collision-resistance, the hash function’s output is typi-
cally assumed to be uniformly random and accessible to attackers only as a black box oracle,
a paradigm known as the random oracle model [KL15]. The collision-resistance of the hash
function is then identified with the asymptotic complexity (in terms of the number of queries
to the oracle) of finding a collision. However, in practice, some properties of specific hash
functions may be exploited by attackers, making the real-world security of the hash func-
tions less than the theoretical analysis in the random oracle model suggests. For example,
some minimal information about the distribution of the images of the hash function may be
exploited. In this work, we analyze the query complexity of collision-finding in hash func-
tions known to have an image distribution of a certain min-entropy. We do so by proving
a chain of reductions that extends a previously established lower bound query complexity
in the random oracle model to hash functions with non-uniform image distributions of min-
entropy k. We do this entirely in the setting of quantum attacks, although the reductions we
show can be easily applied in the classical setting as well.
2 Preliminaries
Here we introduce the reader to a few important notations and definitions.
We consider functions f : X ! Y for some arbitrary X and Y and use Y X to denote
the set of all such functions. The notation f  Y X indicates that f is a function sampled
uniformly from Y X . In general, we consider distributions on the co-domain Y . The notation
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f  DX indicates that f is a function from X to Y sampled from the distribution of functions
induced by sampling each image independently from a distribution D on Y .
Definition 2.1 (Min-Entropy). Let D be a distribution on some set Y . Let D(y) denote the
probability mass corresponding to a y 2 Y under distribution D. D is said to have min-
entropy k if k =  log2(maxx2X{D(x)}). We refer to a distribution of min-entropy k as a
min-k distribution or simply a k-distribution.
Definition 2.2 (Flat-k-Distribution). We call a k-distribution D on set Y with support S a
flat-k-distribution, denoted D
k,[
, if the cardinality of S is exactly 2k. It follows that 8x 2 S,
D(x) = 2 k.
Definition 2.3 ( -k-Distribution). We call a k-distribution D on set Y a  -k-distribution if
there is a unique m 2 Y such that 8y 2 Y
D(y) =
(
2 k if y = m ;
1 2 k
|Y | 1 otherwise ,
and may denote such a distribution D
k, 
. Notice that m is the mode of D, since D has min-
entropy k. The support of D is the entire set Y , and remaining probability mass 1   2 k is
distributed uniformly among all elements in Y other than the mode.
Definition 2.4 (Function of min-entropy k). Let D be a distribution with min-entropy k on
some set Y . Let f : X ! Y be a (in general non-uniformly) random function such that
the image of each input under f is an independent random sample from set Y according to
distribution D. We denote sampling of a function in this way as f  DX . We say that f is a
function of min-entropy k.
Definition 2.5 (Collision Problem). Let f : X ! Y be a function of min-entropy k, whose
images are distributed according to D. A pair of elements x1 2 X and x2 2 X such that
x1 6= x2 and f(x1) = f(x2) is called a collision in f . We refer to the problem of producing such
a pair as the collision finding problem or collision finding problem in D. Suppose an algorithm A
outputs a collision in f . Then we say that A has solved collision finding in D.
Definition 2.6 (Quantum Oracle Access). Suppose O is an oracle for some function f . Sup-
pose A is a quantum algorithm which can submit queries to O in a quantum superposition
(called a quantum query) and receive O’s responses in a quantum superposition. Specifically,
A can implement O as a unitary transformation P↵
x,y,z
|x, y, zi 7! P↵
x,y,z
|x, y + f(x), zi.
Then we say that A has quantum oracle access to f and denote this as Af .
3 Lower bounds: finding a collision is difficult
To prove our query complexity lower bounds, we make use of proof by reduction. We show
that collision finding in any min-k distribution is at least as difficult as collision finding in a
uniform distribution on a set of size 2k. We begin by demonstrating a reduction of collision
finding in a uniform distribution to collision finding in a flat-k distribution. Then we show
a reduction of collision finding in a flat-k distribution to collision finding in a general k-
distribution. These reductions show that any algorithm which is not able to solve collision
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finding in a uniform distribution on a set of size 2k is also not able to solve collision finding
in any k-distribution. This then allows us to extend the query complexity lower bound for
collision finding in a uniform distribution due to Zhandry [Zha15] to collision finding in any
k-distribution.
Each of the following reduction proofs describe an algorithm (which we may refer to as
’the reduction’) attempting to find a collision in a random function f to which it has oracle
access. The algorithm will run as a subroutine another algorithm which is capable of finding
a collision in another random function g when given oracle access to g. Therefore, the proofs
must account for how the reduction algorithm satisfies two requirements: A) that it interacts
with the subroutine algorithm in such a way that, from the perspective of the subroutine, the
subroutine is interacting with an oracle for the random function g, and B) that the collision
in g returned by the subroutine can be converted into a collision in f with sufficiently high
probability. The way the reduction satisfies requirement B by necessity depends on the way
it satisfied requirement A, since converting a collision in g into a collision in f necessarily
depends on how the values of g are generated from the values of f . Hence a single proce-
dure should be used by the reduction to satisfy both requirements. We will refer to such a
procedure as a collision-conversion procedure. Intuitively, a collision-conversion procedure is
an algorithm that in some way processes the responses of the an oracle f so that its output
(perfectly) simulates an oracle for g, and then inverts that process to convert a collision in g
into a collision in f . The formal definition follows.
Definition 3.1 (Collision-conversion procedure). Let C be an algorithm that is given access
to an oracle f whose responses are distributed according some distribution D. For each
unique query submitted to it, C returns an independent random sample drawn according to
some distribution D0. Furthermore, when given as input a pair (x1, x2), C returns either some
collision in f , (x01, x02), in which case we say C succeeds, or returns ? otherwise. Then we call
C a collision-conversion procedure from D to D0. We say C succeeds with probability at least p
if the conditional probability that C succeeds, given that C’s responses to queries x1 and x2
were equal, is at least p, regardless of the values x1 and x2.
In the context of proving lower bounds for query complexity, we must make conservative
assumptions with respect to security and therefore bold assumptions about the capabilities
of the reduction algorithm—giving the algorithm any advantages it could conceivably have.
In particular, we assume the following:
• The reduction has a full description of the distribution in which the subroutine can
solve the collision problem, since it is possible that an adversary will have some or
even all information relating to the image distribution of the function it is attacking.
Formally, suppose the subroutine solves the collision problem in D, a distribution on
Y . For any y 2 Y , let D(y) denote Pr[y0 = y : y0  D], the probability that a random
sample from D is equal to y. We assume that the reduction has perfect knowledge of
D(y) for all y 2 Y .
• The reduction has access to a ‘sufficiently large’ amount of randomness. While we
will be more explicit about this later, the intuition is that the reduction will need to
sample from a distribution generated by the distribution D. As we will not put any
restriction on this distribution (other than having min-entropy k), it is not clear how
much randomness is needed to sample from it. However it is clear that a large but finite
amount of randomness is sufficient to sample arbitrarily close to this distribution.
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• The reduction is not computationally limited. It is conceivable that an adversary with
advance knowledge of the function it is attacking may perform an exponential amount
of precomputation to speed up collision finding.
Before diving into the details of the proofs, a brief comment: the proofs to follow are
all described as fundamentally classical algorithms. This is especially visible in the fact that
individual queries are processed sequentially by oracles and the algorithms that interact with
them. The definition of a collision-conversion procedure above is also implicitly classical in
this way. Nonetheless, the reductions below can easily be generalized to the quantum setting
because nowhere do the reductions utilize knowledge of the characteristics of the set of prior
queries and responses. This is an important feature because quantum algorithms can query
an oracle on a superposition of inputs and receive the responses in a superposition. Hence
any sort of dynamic behavior in which an oracle’s response depends on some analysis of
prior behavior is not possible in the quantum setting. The fact that the reductions we present
below can be (with the exception of the final step) parallelized over the set of all possible
queries indicates their compatibility with quantum computing.
We begin by showing some reusable general results that will allow us to quickly con-
struct reductions and extend query complexity lower bounds by simply demonstrating the
existence of a satisfactory collision-conversion procedure for use in each reduction.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose there exists an algorithm A which solves collision finding in a particular dis-
tribution DA with probability at least PA, using q queries to an oracle whose responses are distributed
according to DA. Suppose there exists a collision-conversion procedure from DA to a distribution DR
that succeeds with probability at least 1/2. Then there exists an algorithm which solves collision find-
ing in DR with probability at least PA/2 using q queries to an oracle whose responses are distributed
according to DR.
Proof. We describe such an algorithm, which we call R for reduction. Upon initialization, run
A and the collision-conversion procedure, which we call C, simultaneously. Let fR denote the
oracle whose responses are distributed according to distribution DR. Grant C access to the
oracle fR and access to all other resources available to the reduction. For each of A’s queries,
forward the query to C, and return C’s response back to A. When A outputs a collision
candidate, forward the collision candidate to C. Return the output of C.
That this algorithm works is clear. By the definition of a collision-conversion procedure,
the algorithm A interacts with an oracle (call it fA) whose responses are distributed according
to DA. Hence A runs as usual, producing a collision in fA with probability PA. Again, by the
definition of a collision-conversion procedure, C will return a collision in fR at least half of
the time that it is given collision in fA. It follows that, at a minimum, the probability that R
outputs a collision in fR is PA/2. Observe also that R uses exactly one query for every query
used by A. Hence lemma 3.2 follows.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose there is some upper bound G(q) on the probability that any algorithm making
q queries to an oracle fR, whose responses are distributed according to a distribution DR, finds a
collision in fR. Suppose there exists a collision-conversion procedure from a distribution DA to DR
that succeeds with probability at least 1/2. Then 2 ·G(q) is an upper bound on the probability that any
algorithm making q queries to an oracle fA, whose responses are distributed according to DA, finds a
collision in fA.
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Proof. This follows directly from contraposition of lemma 3.2. The negation of the conse-
quent of lemma 3.2 is that the probability that any algorithm solves collision finding in DR
using q queries to an oracle whose responses are distributed according to DR must be less
than PA/2. The negation of the antecedent is that the probability any algorithm solves colli-
sion finding in DA using q queries to an oracle whose responses are distributed according to
DA must be less than PA. Expressing this contrapositive with 2 · G(q) taking the role of PA
gives the above corollary.
Lemma 3.4 ([Zha15] Theorem 3.1). There is a universal constant C such that the following holds.
Let f : [M ] ! [N ] be a uniformly random function. Then any algorithm making q quantum queries
to f outputs a collision in f with probability at most C(q + 1)3/N .
Theorem 3.5. Let f
flat
 DX
k,[
be a random function whose outputs are chosen according to a flat-
k-distribution D
k,[
. Then any algorithm making q queries to f
flat
outputs a collision with probability
at most C(q + 1)3/2k, for some constant C.
Proof. This result follows from corollary 3.3 combined with lemma 3.4, with a 2k replacing N .
Hence all that needs to be demonstrated to show theorem 3.5 is that there exists a collision-
conversion procedure from a uniform distribution on a set of size 2k to a flat-k-distribution
D
k,[
which succeeds with probability at least 1/2.
In this case the collision-conversion procedure C is nearly trivial. Let f : X ! Y , where
|Y | = 2k, be a uniformly random function. Let f
flat
: X 0 ! Y 0 be a function whose outputs
are chosen according to a flat-k-distribution D
k,[
on Y 0 with support S. Upon initialization,
prepare any injective mapping g : S ! Y . This can be done by randomly sampling from
Y , without replacement, for each element in S. For each query x, forward the query to the
oracle f which C has access to, and respond with g 1(f(x)). When a pair (x1, x2) is received,
output (x1, x2).
This is, indeed, a collision-conversion procedure from a flat-k-distribution to a uniform
distribution on a set of size 2k. Since g is a permutation, g 1 will map a uniform element of Y
to a uniform element of S. Since f(x) is, by the definition of a uniformly random function, a
uniform element of Y , g 1(f(x)) is a uniform element of S. This means that the distribution
of g 1(f(x)) is the flat-k-distribution on support S. Therefore, when queried, C returns an
independent random sample from the flat-k-distribution, as required. If the responses of C
to the queries x1 and x2 are equal, then g 1(f(x1)) = g 1(f(x2)). Since g is a permutation, this
implies f(x1) = f(x2). Hence the conditional probability that f(x1) = f(x2) given that the
responses of C to the queries x1 and x2 are equal is 1, so C is a collision-conversion procedure
from a flat-k-distribution to a uniform distribution on a set of size 2k which succeeds with
probability 1.
We will show a few theorems of nearly identical structure as theorem 3.5, and in general
we will write all of the constant factors in the probabilities as C, even though they will not
all take the same numerical value, in recognition that they are not interesting for the study
of asymptotic query complexity. The extention of Zhandry’s upper bound on the probability
of solving collision finding in a uniform distribution was to solving collision finding in a flat
distribution with an equally large support was trivial, since the difference between the two
problems is little more than finding a permutation between the two distributions’ supports.
Now we extend Zhandry’s upper bound from flat k-distributions to general k-distributions.
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This is significantly more difficult because the distributions’ supports may differ in size, and
the collision-conversion procedure will necessarily be non-deterministic, since the Shannon
entropy may differ between a flat k-distribution and an arbitrary k-distribution.
Theorem 3.6. Let f
D
 DX be a random function whose outputs are chosen according to a dis-
tribution D of min-entropy k. Then any algorithm making q queries to f
D
outputs a collision with
probability at most C(q + 1)3/2k, for some constant C.
Corollary 3.7. Any quantum algorithm needs at least ⌦(2k/3) queries to find a collision with constant
probability in a random function f
D
 DX whose outputs are chosen according to a distribution D
of min-entropy k.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Once again this result follows from Theorem 3.5 applied to corollary 3.3.
Hence to demonstrate theorem 3.6 a collision-conversion procedure from a flat-k-distribution
to an arbitrary k-distribution, which succeeds with probability at least 1/2, needs to be
shown. We provide an example below.
Let D be an arbitrary k-distribution on support S. Let D
flat
be a flat-k-distribution on
support S
flat
. Let C denote the collision-conversion procedure. Upon initialization, C does
the following:
• Prepare to store a lookup table for a function c : S ⇥ S
flat
! [0, 1]
• Sort and label the elements y
i
of S in order of decreasing probability mass under distri-
bution D, so that D(y1) = 2 k (by the definition of min-entropy, there must be one or
more y
i
2 S with D(y
i
) = 2 k)
• Arbitrarily label the elements z
j
of S
flat
with index j = 1, 2, . . . , 2k.
• Iterate the following over i = 1, 2, . . . , |S|:
– If D(y
i
) = 2 k, set c(y
i
, z
i
) = 1. Set c(y
i
, z
j
) = 0 for all j 6= i. Continue to the next
value of i.
– If D(y
i
) < 2 k, compute
P
i 1
j=1 D(yj) (here j is a dummy-index for the sum and is
unrelated to the labeling of the elements of S
flat
) and save the result as the image
of i under a function g : [|S|]! [0, 1]. Check if g(i) is a multiple of 2 k.
⇤ If so, set c(y
i
, z((g(i)/2 k)+1)) = 2
k
D(y
i
) and c(y
i
, z
j
) = 0 for all j 6= (g(i)/2 k)+1.
⇤ If not, set c(y
i
, zdg(i)/2 ke) = 2
kmin(dg(i)/2 ke g(i), D(y
i
)), set c(y
i
, zdg(i)/2 ke+1) =
2k(D(y
i
) min(dg(i)/2 ke   g(i), D(y
i
))), and set c(y
i
, z
j
) = 0 for all remaining
z
j
2 S
flat
• For each z
j
2 S
flat
, construct the set W
j
containing all y
i
2 S for which c(y
i
, z
j
) 6= 0.
Store the set W
j
as the image of z
j
in a function b : S
flat
! P(S).
Now C enters the query-response phase. Recall that C has access to an oracle whose responses
are distributed according to D
flat
; denote this oracle f
flat
. Suppose that C is queried on some
x 2 S. C responds via the following:
• Query f
flat
on x. Fix some mapping from an index t to each element in b(f
flat
(x)).
Compute m
x
(y
t
) = c(y
t
, f
flat
(x)) for each y
t
2 b(f
flat
(x)). Sample r  [0, 1]. Note: In
practice, sampling such an r would of course take an infinite amount of randomness. If
we only use a finite amount of randomness, then for some distributions we may intro-
duce some small amount of error. However by increasing this amount of randomness,
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we can make this error arbitrarily small such that any q query adversary A cannot de-
tect the error. As we do not care about the efficiency of the reduction C, only the query
complexity, the actual amount of randomness needed for this is not relevant.
• Iterate through i = 1, . . . , |b(f
flat
(x))| until i has a value such that the following condition
holds:
iP
t=1
m
x
(y
t
)   r. Return y
i
.
Finally, when C receives a pair (x1, x2), it outputs the same pair (x1, x2).
To facilitate intuitive understanding of how C fulfills the requirements of a collision-
conversion procedure, we visualize a distribution D as a rectangle divided into disjoint re-
gions, each region representing one element of the support S. The total area of the rectangle
is 1, representing the total probability mass in D. For simplicity, consider momentarily a
distribution of min-entropy 2 on a set of size 5, whose elements we label with the first 5
positive integers. In the distribution represented below, the 1 element has 25% of the prob-
ability mass, while the others share the remaining 75%. Thus 1 is the mode element and its
probability mass determines the min-entropy of the distribution.
1 2 3 4 5 D
Denote the oracle simulated by the query-response phase of C as f
D
. Before it terminates,
C receives a pair (x1, x2), which it attempts to convert into a collision in fflat. In order to
convert a collision in f
D
into a collision in f
flat
, C must map the elements of S into the ele-
ments of S
flat
. Additionally, this mapping must be consistent with C’s responses to queries,
so that a collision another algorithm discovers from C’s responses is likely to correspond to a
collision in the oracle f
flat
.
Clearly, an oracle f
D
with responses distributed according to D generally cannot be per-
fectly simulated by a deterministic mapping of the responses of the oracle f
flat
. Additional
randomness generally must be added by C because the distribution D may have higher Shan-
non entropy than the distribution D
flat
, as |S|   |S
flat
|. However, the oracle f
D
can be sim-
ulated by treating the elements of S
flat
as ’bins’, each associated with one or more elements
of S. In order to generate a sample from S, a sample from S
flat
first selects a ’bin’, and then
one of the elements of S associated with that bin is chosen randomly according a conditional
probability distribution such that the marginal probability of sampling that element is equal
to probability associated with that element under distribution D. This process can be visu-
alized intuitively by vertically aligning rectangular representations of the distributions D
flat
and D. The conditional probability of sampling each element in S given a bin in S
flat
can be
illustrated by projecting the dividers between elements in the rectangle representing D into
the space between the two rectangles. We show a trivial example below, using distributions
of min-entropy 1.
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1 2 3 D
1 2 D
flat
c(1, 1) = 1 c(2, 2) = 0.5 c(2, 3) = 0.5
The diagram above also illustrates the role played by the function c : S ⇥ S
flat
! [0, 1].
This function specifies the conditional probability that C returns a sample of a certain ele-
ment of S given that the oracle f
flat
responded with a certain element from S
flat
. Formally,
c(y, z) = Pr[f
D
(x) = y|f
flat
(x) = z], where x is a query and f
D
(x) is C’s response. All that re-
mains of the collision-conversion procedure then is sampling from the chosen bin according
to the conditional probabilities that c(y, z) specifies. The values encoded into the function c
therefore make up the non-trivial part of the protocol.
In the example above, the elements 2 and 3 have a total probability mass of 0.5 in D, so
they can be ’binned’ into element 2 in D
flat
. Supposing that the 2 element is returned by the
oracle f
flat
, a single uniformly random bit would determine whether C will return 2 or 3 as
the response of f
D
, since each are equally likely under D. If element 1 is returned by f
flat
,
no additional randomness is needed, as c(1, 1) = 1. This is always the case for the mode
element, because its probability mass under D must exactly equal the probability mass of
any of the elements of D
flat
, since D and D
flat
have equal min-entropy.
This procedure will perfectly simulate responses from an oracle f
D
whose responses are
distributed according to D, since the marginal probability of sampling each element in this
fashion exactly replicates the associated probability in D. In this simple case, any collision
found in f
D
will necessarily be a collision in f
flat
. However, this is not true in general. If the
elements of S cannot be grouped into bins each with total probability mass under D equal
to 2 k, then some elements of S must have their probability mass split among multiple bins.
An example of such a case is shown below.
1 2 3 4 5 D
1 2 3 4 D
flat
In cases like these, it is possible that a pair of identical responses from C, constituting an
apparent collision in f
D
, do not actually originate from identical responses from f
flat
, and
therefore do not constitute an actual collision in f
flat
. Luckily, it is possible to construct the
function c such that the probability that a collision in f
D
corresponds to a collision in f
flat
is bounded below by one half, so that C qualifies as a collision-conversion procedure and
8
theorem 3.6 follows. The initialization stage of C contains a general method for constructing
such a function, which we explain now.
The first step is to sort the elements of S in order of decreasing probability under distri-
bution D. The utility of this is that it guarantees that any elements of S which can be trivially
associated with an element in S
flat
, because they have a probability mass equal to 2 k, are
mapped to a single element in S
flat
with probability 1.
Next, C iterates over the elements y
i
of S, setting the value of c(y
i
, z
j
) for all elements z
j
of S
flat
for each. This may be visualized as moving across the rectangular representations
of D and D
flat
from left to right, determining the values of the collision conversion function
along the way. If the probability mass of y
i
under D is 2 k, then all of its probability mass is
associated with the element in S
flat
with the same index, so c(y
i
, z
i
) = 1 (and of course zero
for all other z
j
). If the probability mass corresponding to y
i
in D is less than 2 k, then the
probability mass from y
i
will not ’occupy’ an entire bin in D
flat
, so it must share a bin with
other elements of S. But if the current bin is already partially occupied, it may be the case
that the probability mass of y
i
has to be split between the current bin and the next bin, where
the ’current bin’ and ’next bin’ refer to the elements of S
flat
which, at this point in execution
of C, have the highest index out of the elements for which c has already been assigned and
the lowest index out of the elements for which c has not already been assigned, respectively.
To check whether this is the case, C computes the total probability mass in S that has
already been assigned, which it saves as g(i), and checks whether this value is a multiple
of 2 k. If it is, then the current bin must be completely occupied, and the probability mass
corresponding to y
i
will fit completely inside the next bin. The next bin will in this case be
indexed by (g(i)/2 k) + 1. If g(i) is not a multiple of 2 k, then the probability mass from
element y
i
may need to be split between the current bin and the next bin. In this case, the
index of the current bin will be the ceiling of g(i)/2 k, because if g(i)/2 k = 2.1 then the
first two bins are completely occupied, and one tenth of the third bin is completely occupied,
making the index of the current bin 3. The index of the next bin will thus be the index of the
current bin plus one. The value of c(y
i
, zdg(i)/2 ke), representing the conditional probability of
sampling y
i
given the current bin has been sampled from D
flat
, is set to 2kmin(dg(i)/2 ke  
g(i), P (y
i
)). The minimum function guarantees that if it is possible to fit all the probability
mass from y
i
into the current bin then this is done, and if not, whatever probability mass
can fit into the current bin is assigned to the current bin. Naturally, whatever probability
mass is not assigned to the current bin must be assigned to the next bin, to conserve marginal
probability. The factors of 2k come from the denominator of 2 k in the conditional probability.
Continuing like this, the entire collision-conversion function is constructed. It should be clear
that the procedure just described would lead to a c function like the one illustrated below,
for the example distribution D which we introduced earlier. In general, the c function that
results from this procedure can be visualized by projecting the dividers between elements in
both rectangles into the space between the two rectangles.
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1 2 3 4 5 D
1 2 3 4 D
flat
c(1, 1) = 1
c(2, 2) = 0.75
c(3, 2) = 0.25
c(3, 3) = 0.5
c(4, 3) = 0.5
c(4, 4) = 0.25
c(5, 4) = 0.75
At the end of the initialization stage, for each element in S
flat
, C saves the set of all ele-
ments in S which are associated with it via the c function. These sets are saved in a function
b and will be used to ’invert’ (using the term loosely) the c function for the purpose of simu-
lating the responses of an oracle f
D
whose responses are distributed according to D.
Now we explain the query-response phase of C. Suppose x is one of the queries submitted
to C. The query is forwarded to the oracle f
flat
, and then retrieves the set b(f
flat
(x)) and the
associated conditional probabilities from values of the c function. Next, all C has to do is
sample from the conditional distribution specified by c. It is simple to verify that the next
few steps properly do so via inverse transform sampling.
Finally, C outputs whatever pair of elements is given to it. In order to qualify as a collision-
conversion procedure, the probability that C’s output is a collision in f
flat
conditioned on the
fact that it is given a pair that is a collision in f
D
must be greater than 1/2. We now show that
this is indeed the case.
Suppose C is given a pair (x1, x2). Let y denote fD(x1), C’s response to query x1, and like-
wise let y0 denote f
D
(x2). Let z denote fflat(x1) and z0 denote fflat(x2). Then the probability
that C succeeds in the sense defined in definition 3.1 can be expressed as Pr[z = z0|y = y0]. By
Bayes’ theorem,
Pr[z = z0|y = y0] = Pr[z = z
0]
Pr[y = y0]
Pr[y = y0|z = z0]. (1)
Applying the law of total probability, we may write
Pr[z = z0] =
2kX
j=1
Pr[z = z0|z = z
j
] · Pr[z = z
j
],
Pr[z = z0] =
2kX
j=1
Pr[z0 = z
j
|z = z
j
] · Pr[z = z
j
],
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and, because z and z0 are independent random samples according to distribution D
flat
, this
becomes
Pr[z = z0] =
2kX
j=1
Pr[z0 = z
j
] · Pr[z = z
j
].
By the definition of a flat-k-distribution, the probability that a sample according to D
flat
takes
any specific value z
j
is equal to 2 k. Hence we find that
Pr[z = z0] =
2kX
j=1
(2 k)2 = 2 2k
2kX
j=1
1 = 2 k.
Following the same reasoning just used other than the final step, we may also write
Pr[y = y0] =
|S|X
i=1
(D(y
i
))2.
Then equation (1) can be rewritten as
Pr[z = z0|y = y0] = 2
 k
P|S|
i=1(D(yi))
2
Pr[y = y0|z = z0]. (2)
Now we turn our attention to the conditional probability on the right. Applying the law of
total conditional probability, we decompose the conditional probability into a sum over all
possible values of the random variable z, so
Pr[y = y0|z = z0] =
2kX
j=1
Pr[y = y0|z = z0 ^ z = z
j
] · Pr[z = z
j
|z = z0].
Applying Bayes’ Theorem again, this time to the conditional expression on the far right,
inside the summand, we get
Pr[y = y0|z = z0] =
2kX
j=1
Pr[y = y0|z = z0 ^ z = z
j
] · Pr[z = zj]
Pr[z = z0]
· Pr[z = z0|z = z
j
].
Using our prior result for Pr[z = z0], and the fact that all samples according to D
flat
have
probability 2 k, we can see that the ration in the above equation must be exactly one. Hence
we get
Pr[y = y0|z = z0] =
2kX
j=1
Pr[y = y0|z = z0 = z
j
] · Pr[z0 = z
j
] =
2kX
j=1
Pr[y = y0|z = z0 = z
j
] · 2 k.
Once again applying the law of total conditional probability, this time decomposing the con-
ditional probability in the summand into a sum over all possible values of the random vari-
able y, we get
Pr[y = y0|z = z0] = 2 k
2kX
j=1
|S|X
i=1
Pr[y = y0|z = z0 = z
j
^ y = y
i
] · Pr[y = y
i
|z = z0 = z
j
],
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which we rewrite as
Pr[y = y0|z = z0] = 2 k
2kX
j=1
|S|X
i=1
Pr[y0 = y
i
|z0 = z
j
] · Pr[y = y
i
|z = z
j
].
This step is only possible because y0 and z are independent, so the presence of z0 in the
conditional involving y0 can be ignored. The same goes for y and z0 in the second conditional.
Now, recall that the function c is defined by c(y, z) = Pr[f
D
(x) = y|f
flat
(x) = z]. It follows, by
the definitions of y, y0, z, and z0, that each of the factors in the summand are equal to c(y
i
, z
j
).
Hence we may write
Pr[y = y0|z = z0] = 2 k
|S|X
i=1
2kX
j=1
(c(y
i
, z
j
))2,
in which we have reversed the order of summation. From the details of how the values of
c are assigned when C is initialized, the number of j values for which c(y
i
, z
j
) is non-zero
is either one (if all of y
i
’s probability mass is associated with a single bin), or two (if the
probability mass is split over two bins). If, for a given i only one value of j corresponds to
a non-zero c(y
i
, z
j
), then c(y
i
, z
j
) must be 2kD(y
i
). But we are interested in the worst case,
in order to establish a lower bound. If, for a given i, two values of j correspond to a non-
zero c(y
i
, z
j
), then we know that the two values of c must sum to 2kD(y
i
). In this case, the
sum of the squares of these values will be less than 2kD(y
i
). We can express this sum as
c
2
1 + c
2
2 = c
2
1 + (2
k
D(y
i
)   c1)2. The minimum value for this parabola is 22k 1D(yi)2, when
c = 2k 1D(y
i
). Therefore we may write,
Pr[y = y0|z = z0]   2 k
|S|X
i=1
22k 1(D(y
i
))2 = 2k 1
|S|X
i=1
(D(y
i
))2.
Substituting this expression into equation (2), we get
Pr[z = z0|y = y0]   2
 k
P|S|
i=1(D(yi))
2
· 2k 1
|S|X
i=1
(D(y
i
))2 =
1
2
.
Therefore we conclude that
Pr[C succeeds]   1
2
.
Hence C satisfies the definition of a collision-conversion procedure from a flat-k-distribution
to an arbitrary k-distribution.
Although Theorem 3.5’s upper bound on the success probability of any algorithm in col-
lision finding clearly extends to a  -k-distribution, since a  -k-distribution is merely a spe-
cial case of a k-distribution for which the theorem holds, it is possible to show a reduction
of collision finding in an arbitrary k-distribution to collision finding in a  -k-distribution.
This is interesting because it affirms that the  -k-distribution case is the most difficult out
of all k-distributions. The proof is easy to find by mimicking the proof of theorem 3.5 but
replacing all references of 2 k as the probability of sampling each element from the flat dis-
tribution with a general probability D(x), and replacing the general distribution D with a
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 -k-distribution D
 
. This works in the case that no elements in the support of D are associ-
ated with a probability mass less than 1/N . One has to employ the idea of computational
indistinguishability to extend this result to the case that there are some elements associated
with smaller probability mass than 1/N .
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